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Abstract
The new 14.2-mile Orange Line Busway opened in October 2005. Many aspects of the 
Orange Line’s design should be copied elsewhere: its attractive guideway and stations, 
state-of-the-art buses, proof-of-payment fare collection, and well-done environmen-
tal mitigations. On the other hand, a typical Orange Line bus trip catches about 11 
red lights and waits up to nine minutes for them to change. Its end-to-end travel 
speed is 20 mph. The travel time is also compromised by a 25 mph speed restriction 
at all intersections and speed limits along other portions of the busway.
The lesson of the Orange Line to transit planners is that an at-grade busway will 
almost certainly not get signal preemption. This means it will not have the crossing 
gates that allow its buses to cross intersections at speed. Therefore, every other effort 
should be made to increase a busway’s travel speed through off-board fare collection, 
well-located platforms, minimal speed restrictions, and quick transferring to connect-
ing services. A busway will be less expensive to build than a light rail alternative, but 
without signal preemption its travel speed will be significantly less. 
A light rail alternative for the Orange Line would have had required crossing gates. 
Even if trains operated at the same lower speeds as buses within median rights-of-
way, they would have been much faster (29 mph) and offered a more stable ride 
quality. 
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Introduction
This article reviews the operation of Los Angeles’s new Metro Orange Line busway. 
It is intended to help transit planners assess both the benefits and drawbacks of 
such a project. Local conditions will always determine the design specifics of a 
capital project, but often designs in one community build from designs—good or 
bad—for similar facilities elsewhere. The article also examines the supposition that 
the Orange Line operates like a light rail line.
Project Description
The Orange Line is a 4.-mile busway on an old railroad right-of-way running 
east-west across Los Angeles’s San Fernando Valley. Its eastern end feeds the 
northern terminus of the Red (rapid transit) Line to downtown Los Angeles; its 
other end serves Warner Center, a locus of office towers to the west (see Figure 
).  The project serves several colleges and civic centers along its routes, but the 
predominant adjacent land use is residential. In June 006, the busway carried 
almost ,000 daily trips.
Operationally, the Orange Line is an end-to-end trunk line using articulated, 
low-floor buses. Its scheduled run time is 4 minutes. Its headways are 5 minutes 
during the peaks, 0 minutes mid-day, and 0 minutes after :45 pm. The right-of-
way has 33 street crossings, and bus speeds at these crossings are restricted to 5 
mph by policy. After several early car-bus accidents, the crossing speed was further 
restrained to 0 mph, but this is expected to be temporary. Buses operate between 
crossings at maximum speeds of either 35 mph (within the median of a city street), 
45 mph, or 55 mph depending on the line section. 
The service was the result of a 0-year effort to clear and approve a light rail line. 
Perhaps for this reason the new service was described as “a train on rubber tires” 
during start-up ceremonies (Fanfare Greets Start of Orange Line Buses 005, quote 
by MTA Chief Executive Director Roger Snoble). The articulated buses were “to 
mimic the metallic look and spacious feel of a passenger rail car” (Fanfare Greets 
Start of Orange Line Buses 005, description of buses by staff writer Caitlin Liu). 
The line was named a color as are the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit 
Authority’s (MTA) subway and light rail lines and is shown on the MTA’s rail sys-
tem maps.
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History of Planning the Orange Line
Proposition A was approved by Los Angeles County voters in 980. It provided a 
half-cent sales tax in part for a rail system to be built within 3 designated “Prop 
A” corridors. One of these broad corridors was east-west across the San Fernando 
Valley from North Hollywood to the Warner Center area. In 984 it was designated 
one of six high-priority corridors for implementation. The preferred alignment 
within this corridor was Southern Pacific’s Burbank Branch, and the preferred 
mode was light rail.
Transit planners began developing a light rail line generally following the Burbank 
Branch right-of-way in 985. Years of planning efforts followed. Community oppo-
sition to the rail project centered on the perception of lowered property values 
and system noise, although a general fear of change was also apparent. Major 
related reports were published in 986, 98, 990, 99, 994, 998, and 000. 
The last report was the first to adopt a busway concept. The communities resisted 
the busway as well, but after 5 years of fighting, they realized some improvement 
was inevitable—and the MTA forcefully resisted further opposition. The decision 
to build the line was made in 00, construction started in 00, and the busway 
was inaugurated in October 005.
Little discussion of bus operations is found in the environmental documents. 
Summary tables project end-to-end travel times between 8.8 minutes and 40.0 
minutes. The goal of the project was very fast service. There is no indication in the 
environmental documents that bus cruising speeds would be limited to 35 mph 
and 45 mph for most of the busway. Nor is there any indication that bus crossing 
speeds would be restricted to 5 mph at all intersections. As to signal priority, 
there is only this disclaimer: “Precise signal timing and priority parameters would 
not be set until just prior to the commencement of BRT operations and would 
likely be adjusted throughout the life of the project.”3 
The Busway Design 
In designing the busway, engineers had the advantage of being able to use an 
existing railroad right-of-way across an almost flat urban setting. The right-of-way 
is typically 00 feet wide, but varies from 0 to 00 feet. The bus roadway itself is 
6 feet wide with one lane in each direction. At platforms, the roadway widens 
on one side to 3 feet, which allows a bus to pass another in case of breakdowns. 
There are also 50 pullouts along the busway primarily for maintenance vehicles to 
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park; these are typically 0-feet long and 0-feet deep. The alignment is capable of 
supporting maximum operating speeds of 55 mph. 
The busway appears to be an asset to the communities along it route. It provides 
easy east-west access to important Valley destinations. It replaces an unused dirt 
right-of-way prone to trash dumping with a very attractively landscaped improve-
ment offering some sound walls, pedestrian crosswalks, and the continuous bike-
way. Unlike a light rail line (or the freight train traffic up to the late 980s), there is 
no mandated horn noise associated with bus crossings at intersections.
Busway Stations and Access 
The Orange Line has  stations within the railroad right-of-way portion of the 
line. Each has sidewalk-level platforms, canopied, long enough for two buses, and 
equipped with passenger information displays. Fare collection is by off-bus ticket 
vending machines and fare enforcement is proof of payment (on-board random 
checking with fines). Table  summarizes the platform location and access facilities 
of the stations. 
Table 1. Busway Station Characteristics
 
  Connecting N-S   
Station Platform Location Bus Routes Parking
Warner Center Sidewalk 8 No
DeSoto Avenue Far Side  No
Pierce College Far Side  No
Tampa Avenue Far Side  No
Reseda Avenue Far Side  00
Balboa Avenue Westbound–Near Side 4 50
 Eastbound–Far Side 
Woodley Avenue Far Side  No
Sepulveda Avenue Not at Cross Street  ,9
Van Nuys Blvd. Westbound–Near Side  84
 Eastbound–Far Side 
Woodman/Oxnard Westbound–Near Side
 Eastbound–Far Side  No
Valley College Westbound–Near Side
 Eastbound–Far Side 3 No
Laurel Canyon Far Side  No
North Hollywood Near Side Terminal  convenient, K&R
  6 others, Red Line
. Local bus route 64 parallels the Orange Line from Warner Center along Victory to the Sepulveda 
and Van Nuys Stations. Local bus route 56 parallels the line from Van Nuys to North Hollywood.
. A major bus center is located east of the Red Line Station, but it starts 400 feet from the busway 
alighting platform west of Lankershim Boulevard.
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The Traffic Signal Control System
The City of Los Angeles Department of Transportation(LADOT) now has 3,00 
of its 4,300 intersections tied into its Automated Traffic Surveillance and Control 
(ATSAC) system. The ATSAC system improves the flow of traffic by coordinating 
the phasing and timing of green lights. LADOT developed an added feature, the 
Transit Priority System (TPS), to ATSAC to give buses on key bus routes up to 0 
percent more signal cycle time if delayed. The Orange Line busway crossing signals 
are tied into the ATSAC/TPS system.
LADOT modeled a possible busway before it was officially adopted by the MTA. 
From this work, it was determined that signal priority was possible for the busway, 
but not full-signal preemption (any approaching bus causes crossing motorists to 
stop). LADOT calculated a total of one million daily north-south auto trips across 
the 33 Orange Line intersections; these trips needed as much green signal time as 
possible. Traffic engineers also recommended far-side platforms wherever possible 
because it would be more difficult to pretime the following traffic signal with a 
near-side station dwell of unknown duration. Crossing gates were considered, but 
were ruled out by LADOT because its traffic engineers felt that motorists did not 
require the same level of crossing protection from buses as they did from light rail 
trains.4 The need to lower crossing gates in advance of a bus’s arrival would also 
unnecessarily lengthen delays to the heavy north-south traffic. Although LADOT 
made its decisions for the Orange Line, the resulting busway operation is similar 
to that of the South Miami Busway and may reflect an emerging consensus among 
traffic engineers on how an at-grade busway should be operated.
As the MTA conducted prerevenue operations testing, LADOT engineers refined 
the timing of the signal priority system. It operates a little like a “green wave” 
assuming that buses travel at their posted speeds, have station dwell times of 
about 0 seconds, and cross intersections at 5 mph. But even then LADOT engi-
neers estimate that a bus trip typically catches red lights at a third of the inter-
sections ( red lights), an average consistent with a dozen field trips made. The 
system is also designed to retain the scheduled headway. This means that if a bus 
is behind schedule, it is given more green time to help it catch up to the timetable, 
but the trailing buses are given no priority to preserve the timetable. If a lead bus 
is well behind schedule, all the following buses may be as well—but evenly spaced. 
The LADOT’s traffic monitoring center can follow the movement of each Orange 
Line bus by its on-board transponders and intersection cameras. The transponders 
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are also used to inform patrons when the next bus is due using automated station 
message boards.
Project Costs
The forecasted construction cost of the project is $90 million. It was funded 
through local Proposition C ($50. million), State of California ($45.0 million), 
and federal ($.5 million) dollars.5 Table  shows the project’s costs by major cost 
categories. 
Table 2. Orange Line Project Forecasted Costs (millions)
Cost Component Current Forecast Percentage of Total Cost per Unit
Guideway $36. 34.8% $0./bswy-mile
Systems and Equipment $9. .3% $0./bswy-mile
Stations $30.4 .8% $.3/station
Vehicles and Buses $6. 4.3% $./mile
Special Conditions3 $34.6 8.9% $.4/mile
Misc. Rights-of-Way $3.4 3.4% $.0/bswy-mile
Yards and Shops $. 0.3% $./project
Professional Services $4.0 .% $3.3/mile
Contingency $. 0.5% $0./mile
Subtotal $90.0 4.4% $9.4/mile
RR, Drive-in, and Misc.  $00.0 5.6% $.4/bswy-mile
Rights-of-Way
Total $390.0 00.0% $.4/mile
. See Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. 006. Quarterly project status 
report, Metro Orange Line, June 2006. Project Cost Status Table, p. 4.
. “Bswy-mile” = mileage of busway itself (3.5), “miles” = project miles (4.).
3. Includes costs associated with environmental mitigation and compliance, master cooperative 
agreements, insurance programs, safety program, artwork, and systems integration testing.
 
In 990 the LACTC purchased the entire 0-mile Burbank Branch and adjacent 
railroad properties for $. million. Of the busway’s 4. miles, 3.5 miles were 
built on the right-of-way, which can be conservatively valued at $85 million. The 
Sepulveda Boulevard Station’s parking lot—an old drive-in theater—was pur-
chased in 99 for about $5 million. These costs do not show up in the official 
project budget, but have been included in Table . 
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The $.4 million per mile for the Orange Line is substantially less than MTA’s cost 
per mile for its light rail lines. The Gold Line averaged about $65 million per mile, 
all costs included, and the Blue Line around $45 million, both in earlier dollars. 
The Exposition Line is projected to cost $0 million per mile by the time it starts 
operations in 00. At $65 million per mile, an Orange (light rail) Line would have 
cost $95 million. 
The City of Los Angeles contributed an additional $0.6 million for the bikeway. 
Portions of the bikeway already existed and others used existing city streets. The 
newly built segments totaled 8. miles, an average of $.3 million per mile.
Busway Operations
The Orange Line operates as a trunk line feeder to the Red Line. Only new, articu-
lated, low-floor buses painted specially for this service use the busway. Other buses 
do not merge into the busway at interim stations. However, the type of service one 
would associate with a busway (or light rail line) operating over its own right-of-
way—high operating speeds and no delays—is compromised on the Orange Line 
in five ways. 
Signal Priority
LADOT feels that blending the busway into its ATSAC/TPS system is the optimal 
solution. But it is disconcerting that buses catch an average of  red lights per trip. 
These delays are compounded because half the red light delays occur just before a 
subsequent far-side station dwell.
Restrictions to Maximum Speed
Maximum speeds are restricted along most portions of the busway to conform 
to neighborhood desires or to provide additional safety. Buses proceed at 35 
mph from the North Hollywood Station along Chandler Boulevard to Woodman 
Avenue (.6 miles), the most community-sensitive portion of the Line; 45 mph 
from Woodman Avenue to Sepulveda Boulevard (.9 miles); 55 mph through the 
Sepulveda Basin (4. miles); then back to 45 mph from Reseda Boulevard to the 
end of the busway (3.8 miles). 
Slowing at Grade-Crossings
All Orange Line buses initially slowed to 5 mph at all intersecting streets. The rea-
son given for this is that bus-car accidents are more dangerous for bus passengers 
(than for light rail passengers) and more caution is therefore needed. After a series 
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of bus-car accidents in the first month of operation, the bus crossing speed was 
(temporarily) dropped to 0 mph. (In practice, bus drivers rarely cross an inter-
section below 5–0 mph, in part because the timetable and the ATSAC system 
timing were not changed.)  
North Hollywood Station Terminal Design
The east end of the Orange Line ends just west of Lankershim Boulevard (see 
Figure ). Across the street are the Red Line Station entrances and, further east, 
the Red Line’s bus center where six bus routes come together. Most Orange Line 
riders transfer to (or from) the Red Line and must walk at least 400 feet to the Red 
Line escalators and cross busy Lankershim Boulevard. An additional 50 feet more 
is required to get to and from the bus center. Three reasons are given by planners 
and engineers for this design: 
. A west-side pedestrian entrance to the Red Line mezzanine was planned, 
but its estimated $0 million cost was not affordable.
. If the busway were to continue across Lankershim Boulevard, the Red Line 
station’s entrance plaza would have had to be reconfigured or even sacri-
ficed.
3. Another intersection with Lankershim Boulevard would have been too 
disruptive for traffic in this busy area. 
None of these points seem to outweigh the huge on-going passenger inconve-
nience caused by this poor interface.
Bicycle Policy
Because of the side sway of a bus, bicycles brought on-board must be anchored 
for passenger safety. The bus driver must leave his seat and supervise the loading; 
unloading is typically done by the bicycle’s owner. The results are station dwell 
times of  to 3 minutes for bicycle loading (compared with wheelchair loading 
times of less than a minute). The resulting scheduled delays, albeit only on occa-
sional trips, makes this policy decision questionable.
Alternative Busway Operating Scenarios
Using engineering drawings of the busway, a run-time model was developed that 
allows the effects of different operating assumptions to be compared (Los Angeles 
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority 00). The model calculates the 
accelerating, cruising, and braking times and distances for each line segment that 
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requires the bus to alter speed (e.g., intersections, stations, curves).6 It accumulates 
these times (plus station dwell) and distances over the length of the project. The 
model also incorporates “delay” time caused by red lights, etc. The result was cali-
brated against the Orange Line timetable by making adjustments to the “delay” 
times. Below are descriptions of the operating scenarios evaluated. They are sum-
marized in Table 3.
• Existing Service (Base Case). 5 mph at cross streets, restricted maximum 
speeds, experienced delays from red lights, and 0-second average dwells.
• Buses Slowing to 10 mph at Crossings. Same as the base scenario except that 
buses slow to 0 mph at crossings, the temporary condition.
• Signal Preemption. No red lights are encountered, buses slow to 5 mph at 
street crossings. The difference between the base case time and this run’s 
time approximates the total delay for expected red light delays.
• Speed at Crossings. This means, for example, in the 35 mph maximum speed 
zone, buses cross an intersection at 35 mph. 
• 55 mph Through Intersections. This scenario treats the buses the same as light 
rail trains, and would probably require gated crossings at all intersections. 
Table 3. Assumptions for Alternative Busway Operating Scenarios
Operating 25 mph  Signal  Restricted  20-Sec  Gated 
Scenario at Crossings  Priority Max Speed  Dwell Crossings
Base: Existing Service yes existing yes yes no
0 mph Crossings no existing yes yes no
Signal Preemption yes complete yes yes no
Speed at Crossings no complete yes yes 
55 mph Throughout no complete 55 mph yes all
Table 4 summarizes the resulting end-to-end travel times. The initial operating 
scenario is the base case, and its run time is 4 minutes as per the timetable. Giv-
ing Orange Line buses signal preemption—even though crossing speeds remain 
5 mph—would save the most amount of time and raise the average travel speed 
the most. Allowing buses to cross intersections at the prevailing posted busway 
speeds further lowers travel time by .4 minutes. Finally, allowing buses to travel 
at a maximum speed of 55 mph throughout lowers travel time only .8 minutes 
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more. Table 4 illustrates the importance of getting buses through red lights: up to 
9 minutes could be saved if there were none.
Table 4. Busway Time Savings/Losses with Various Operating Assumptions
 End-to-End Average  Additional Additional 
 Travel Time Travel Speed Time Savings Time Savings
Busway Operating (minutes) (mph) (minutes) (%)
0 mph Crossings 46.6 8 - 4.6    - %
Base: Existing Service 4. 0 0.0 0%
Signal Preemption 3. 6 + 9.4   + %
Speed at Crossings 9. 9 + 3.0    + %
55 mph Throughout .8 3 + .9  + 5%
Alternative Light Rail Scenarios
The Orange Line has been described as a rail line using rubber tires. Is it? To 
determine the travel times for the Orange Line were it in fact light rail, the same 
travel time model was used, but with the acceleration/deceleration profiles of the 
MTA’s light rail vehicles. As is standard design for light rail, all intersections have 
crossing gates that give light rail trains automatic signal preemption. Is it fair, then 
to compare the Orange Line without signal preemption with LRT with it? Yes, 
because each is being operated as it normally would in an urban setting. Table 5 
summarizes the LRT operating scenarios. 
Table 5. Assumptions for Alternative Light Rail Operating Scenarios
Operating 25 mph  Signal  Restricted  20-Sec  Gated 
Scenario at Crossings  Priority Max Speed  Dwell Crossings
Speed at Crossing no complete yes yes all
55 mph Throughout no complete 55 mph yes all
65 mph Throughout no complete 65 mph yes all
The resulting travel times are shown in Table 6. The base case for light rail results 
in an end-to-end travel time of 9 minutes. This time includes the 35 mph running 
along Chandler, 45 mph to Sepulveda, and 45 mph between White Oak and the 
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end of the railroad right-of-way. Allowing the light rail trains to travel at 55 mph 
throughout (except, of course, in Warner Center) lowers the total travel time by 
another . minutes.
Table 6. Light Rail Time Travel Times with Various Operating Assumptions
 End-to-End Average  Additional Additional 
Light Rail  Travel Time Travel Speed Time Savings Time Savings
Operating Scenario (minutes) (mph) (minutes) (%)
Speed at Crossing 9.0 9 -    -
55 mph Throughout 6.8 3 + .  + 8%
65 mph Throughout 6.5 3 + 0.3 + %
The Orange (busway) Line’s operating performance cannot be compared favor-
ably to an Orange (light rail) Line’s performance. A light rail line is much faster and 
more reliable because its crossing gates would allow it to avoid red lights. (Both 
wheelchairs and bicyclists could also board and alight within a normal 0-second 
station dwell.)  
Comparison with a Rapid Bus Route
Local bus route 64 serves the Warner Center transit hub and from there to Van 
Nuys Boulevard it parallels the Orange Line alignment and serves four of its sta-
tions directly. It arrives at Van Nuys and Victory, one-half mile north of the busway 
station, and, were it to turn south, it could serve the Van Nuys Station within 34 
minutes. Local bus route 56 serves the Van Nuys Station and then proceeds south 
and east to the North Hollywood Station. The end-to-end travel time of the com-
bined two local routes is 5 minutes over a 5.4-mile length. The combined route 
would directly serve nine of the Orange Line’s 3 stations and be within one-half 
mile of the others. 
If the combined route were to be converted into a rapid bus service, however, its 
end-to-end travel time would be much closer to the busway’s. To calculate its run 
time, the run-time model was calibrated for local bus routes 64 and 56. Then 
the number of bus stops was reduced from the existing 3. per mile to  per mile, 
the same spacing as the Orange Line. The same speed restrictions and signal delays 
encountered with the local buses were retained, although a rapid bus service 
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would receive some level of signal priority not calculated here. Orange Line articu-
lated bus speed profiles were also substituted for regular local bus profiles. 
The results are shown in Table . The end-to-end travel time drops to 44 minutes, 
almost that of the busway’s travel time. Capital costs associated with a rapid bus 
line would be an estimated $50 million including new buses, passenger informa-
tion systems, upgraded stations/stops and support facilities.
Table 7. Rapid Bus Time Travel Time
 End-to-End Average  Additional Additional 
 Travel Time Travel Speed Time Savings Time Savings
Bus Scenario (minutes) (mph) (minutes) (%)
Local Bus #64 & 56 5 6 -    -
Rapid Bus Route 44.4    +.6  +%  
The rapid bus alternative does have operational limitations. It is not on a pro-
tected, well-defined, transitway, which in and of itself is a great benefit to the San 
Fernando Valley. Over time, as San Fernando Valley traffic congestion builds, the 
rapid bus line may also become a slower service. 
Summary
Table 8 presents the various travel times for all Orange Line options and their 
estimated costs. While the Orange Line does provide travel times substantially less 
than local bus services, it is not much better now than a rapid bus service. Light 
rail would have been the fastest and most reliable alternative, taking advantage of 
rail’s crossing gates and better rate of acceleration. Its capital cost, however, would 
have been the highest of all alternatives. Much of the cost for both the busway and 
the light rail alternatives entails assuring long-term schedule reliability, and this 
must be factored into any evaluation. The busway in turn should be more reliable 
than a rapid bus service operating on city streets.
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Table 8. Summary of Orange Line Alternatives
 End-to-End Average  Estimated Long-term 
Operating Scenario Travel Time Speed Capital Cost Reliability 
Existing Bus Routes  5 minutes 6 mph  - Low
64 and 56
Rapid Bus 44 minutes  0 mph   $50 million Fair
    (estimate)
Busway 4 minutes 0 mph  $390 million  Good
Light Rail 9 minutes 9 mph  $95 million  Very Good
    (estimate)
Conclusions
The Orange Line is a significant transit addition to the San Fernando Valley, pro-
viding direct access for communities along its route to important centers as well 
as to the Red Line. It is well designed as a roadway, well landscaped, and offers 
additional community benefits. It uses state-of-the-art, low-floor buses and takes 
advantage of the guideway and buses by using proof-of-payment fare collection. 
It is important to emphasize that planning of the Orange Line was a collaborative 
effort between the MTA and LADOT. 
The operation of the Orange Line has been compromised, however, by a signal 
priority system that ended up less than what its planners and officials anticipated. 
It is here where other systems can learn important lessons. 
• Traffic engineers appear to be very reluctant to give busway buses signal 
preemption with or without crossing gates. As a result, potential travel 
speeds on an at-grade busway are substantially compromised. 
• A transit agency should be reluctant to build a busway without guarantees 
that signal preemption will be provided. But if it goes ahead with less than 
preemption, it should do a careful study of how to minimize delays: closing 
crossings, the fewest possible red lights, well-located platforms to mini-
mize the double-stop penalty of far-side stops, quick and easy transferring 
at end-points, and fare collection and other policies that lessen delays. If 
signal preemption cannot be obtained during peak periods, it may well be 
acceptable off-peak and on weekends.
• When spending so much for a busway, crossing gates for buses are a good 
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investment to assure full signal preemption and higher operating speeds. 
This is the case even if bus speeds are restricted at crossings.
The analysis also shows it is not correct to equate the Orange Line Busway (or any 
similar at-grade busway) with a light rail line. Instead of an average end-to-end 
trip time of 4 minutes (0 mph), even a speed-restricted light rail line would have 
taken no more than 9 minutes (9 mph), a 3 percent drop in travel time. The 
ride quality of a light rail line would also be better.
This analysis does not conclude that the Orange Line should have been a light rail 
line. The Orange Line could not have been a light rail line because community 
opposition to that mode was clear and enduring. Nor does the analysis conclude 
that the Orange Line busway should not have been built; the San Fernando Valley 
is better served by a busway than a rapid bus route on ever-congested city streets. 
Given the availability of the Burbank Branch right-of-way, not using it as some 
form of transitway would have been unthinkable.
The MTA must continue to find ways to increase the Orange Line’s travel speeds, 
correct the very unfortunate North Hollywood Station transfer, and seek increased 
signal priority for its buses, up to and including crossing gates.   
Endnotes
 In June 006 the MTA changed the Orange Line’s timetable. In the eastbound 
direction and throughout the day, up to 3 minutes were added to the earlier run 
times, often all 3 minutes between the last two stations. In the westbound direc-
tion run times decreased by up to  minutes, but never increased. For this analysis 
the original 4-minute schedule is used.
 See Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority 004, Table RS-
4a: Refinements to Locally Preferred Alternative.
3 See Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority 004.
4 Crossing gates are required by the California Public Utilities Commission for 
light rail trains above 35 mph in large part because a loaded light rail car weighs 
0,000+ pounds and a collision with a railcar may well be fatal. Bus movements 
are controlled locally by traffic engineers. (A loaded 60-foot bus weighs 44,000 
pounds.)
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5 These figures total $33 million, the total funds anticipated for the project. The 
forecasted budget was $90 million in June 006 with the project virtually com-
plete.
6 On the advise of MTA staff, the model used the APTA guidelines for the accelera-
tion and deceleration of articulated buses, which are compatible with Orange Line 
bus performance curves.
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